Social-Cultural Critique: The Conceptualization of Scientific Time through an SAE Language


How would you feel if I told you that time does not pass, and that there is no such thing as the past, present or future? If you’re anything like me, your initial reaction is one of radical disagreement. Why such a strong reaction? It stems from the fact that human experience (from an SAE perspective) is seemingly predicated on the fact that time passes: events are future as we anticipate them, present as we experience them, and finally past as we remember them. As Sapir explains in his piece “The Status of Linguistics as a Science,” our very experience as humans is intimately bound up with the language we speak. Language is not “merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or rejection,” but rather something we “are very much at the mercy of, … [something] which has become the medium of expression for [our] society.” Many of the things we experience throughout our lives are subjective interpretations made through language in our minds, rather than the experience of objective qualities of the universe. Whorf’s comparison of SAE and Hopi languages demonstrates this further, as SAE languages, for example, objectify the abstract concept of time while Hopi uses relations to conceptualize that same idea. For the sake of this argument, it is necessary to delve a little into the philosophy of time to define two of the competing theories regarding the reality of time and its passage. There are more possible accounts than these two, but for the scope of this blog post I will limit it to the “A-series” and “B-series” accounts of time. 

A philosopher by the name of J.M.E. McTaggart was the one to lay out these series in his The Unreality of Time, which are known as realist accounts of time: both depend on the idea that time is a real aspect of the universe. The A-series, generally referred to as “clock time,” comprehends the ordering of events in terms of intrinsic temporal qualities of past, present, and future. The B-series, sometimes called  “calendar time,” orders events based on the terms “earlier” and “later.” These two accounts actually map surprisingly well onto the difference between temporal forms of SAE and Hopi languages. On one hand, tense, and thus SAE languages, lines things up in terms of A-series qualities of past (was), present (is), and future (will be). On the other hand, Hopi’s only temporal form, mode, comes about when two clauses are related and need ordering in time of occurrence. Hopi does this with relations of earlier, later, and simultaneous, exactly like the B-series. Due to language’s major role in human interpretation of events, it makes sense that speakers of SAE languages adhere much more closely to the conceptualization of events in terms of A-series qualities. 

As it turns out, the A-series is a lot less objective than it appears to be on the surface. Understanding events and their real order of occurrence, through an SAE language, in terms of the A-series qualities, without relying on B-series terminology, turns out to be a major problem for the A-series. McTaggart uses the existence of infinite regression regarding the truth conditions of tensed statements to argue against the reality of A-series qualities. In A-series terms, there is no way to fully specify the conditions needed for the statement “O did happen” to be true: it will only devolve into infinite regression. For example, take “event O,” say the 2000 Olympics, which took place in Sydney, Australia. Thus, the statement “O did happen” is true, but it is not always true. It was not true when O was present in 2000 or before 2000 when O was future, and so “O did happen” is only true when O is past in the present. However, this doesn’t fully specify the truth conditions because the statement “O is past in the present” is not always true, and so it must be further qualified. In 1999, O is future in the present, so it is necessary to state that “O is past in the present” is true in the present, but you still can’t stop there since that statement is only true sometimes, and so on forever. This is how the infinite regression forms, because using A-series qualities is insufficient in satisfying the truth conditions of any statement uttered with A-series qualities. It is only the use of B-series qualities, “‘O did happen’ is true if the statement occurs later than 2000.” (Bardon 83-84). 

If this doesn’t satisfy your need for explanation as to why the A-series is not an accurate account of scientific time, Einstein’s theory of special relativity proves to be the most devastating of blows to the A-series. It argues directly against the existence of objective qualities of time because “no observer has a privileged vantage point from which to determine the ‘truth’ of the matter” (Bardon 90). The example of Albert and Isaac at the train station witnessing two lightning flashes demonstrates this perfectly. On one hand, Isaac, who is sitting on a bench, sees the lightning flashes as simultaneous events. Albert on the other hand, who is on the train, experiences one flash first and the other shortly after. If neither person mistook the order of events, then neither Isaac nor Albert are wrong about their ordering of strikes. If events had intrinsic qualities of pastness, presentness, and futurity, then there would be no disagreement between Albert and Isaac, or one of them would be correct and the other would be wrong. The A-series requires events to possess temporal qualities that change over time, but relativity states that events simply do not have those essential qualities: an event in my future could happen in your past depending on our frames of reference (Bardon 63-64).  

This is certainly an oversimplification of the theory of special relativity and McTaggart’s accounts of time, as he is actually a firm supporter of the account known as the C-series. However, the important takeaway is that within the majority of philosophical circles, the A-series is almost unanimously rejected as an accurate depiction of scientific time for, among others, the reasons stated above. Thus, the idea of time passing is nonsensical, as without intrinsic temporal properties that distinguish one event from another, things simply “be” different at different times (notice the use of “be,” rather than a tensed verb) according to the observer and their frame of reference. It is difficult to even speak about how the B-series truly works because SAE language is so dependent on tense and A-series qualities. When an SAE speaker  is told that the passage of time does not exist, there is an (understandably) adverse reaction. The reaction you probably had at the beginning of this post and are probably currently having as I reaffirm the statement that the passage of time doesn’t exist, sources greatly from the linguistic system we use to make sense of the world. To SAE speakers, our representation of the world is intimately bound up in tenses that designate things as past, present and future. Hopi speakers do not conceptualize events in the same way because the structure of their linguistic system is different. Whether or not Hopi speakers would actually be receptive to the B-series (or other non-A-series accounts of time) is difficult to say for certain, but it would certainly be an interesting hypothesis to test. However, just trying to translate this argument, which is partially based on tenses, into a language like Hopi that does not rely on tense would likely be an arduous process, and might not even be able to be accurately translated. For the sake of argument, suppose this could be translated accurately. A Hopi speaker’s reaction to this account of time could shed further light on just how much language shapes the world we experience: a positive reception would reinforce the concept that habitually talking about something, like time, can form certain conceptions in your mind. 


Works Cited from Outside Class Material


Bardon, Adrian. A Brief History of the Philosophy of Time. Oxford University Press, 2013.


J. Ellis McTaggart. “The Unreality of Time.” Mind, vol. 17, no. 68, 1908, pp. 457–474. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/2248314. Accessed 2 May 2021.





Comments

  1. Thoughtful, fascinating, and mind-expanding! Somehow I missed it when you first published it, but I'm so glad to have read it now (whatever "now" means . . . ). :-)

    ReplyDelete

Post a Comment

Popular Posts