The Imposition of Illusory Boundaries upon Culture
By Jacob Wright
Across all the social sciences, systems of classification are used to denote boundaries between different areas of culture. For example, we use nationality to describe membership in a particular group which shares common traits such as traditions, history, and beliefs. Contemporary political discourses use the terms nation and country interchangeably, but this does not capture the fluidity of group membership. We use the terms Korean as a label for a 'single' nationality or people - yet these terms encompass wide ranges of political and ideological variation. We can draw from Foucault's genealogy of Western discourses of sexuality to develop a similar historical tracing of 'nationality'. For example, the Korean 'people' has been divided along the political boundary between North and South since the war between the two sides in the 1950s. Does this mean that we should now label the two halves as two different peoples? In the last 80 years, the sides have certainly developed different cultural traits. Most notably, the UN estimates that South Korea represents the 10th largest economy in the world and the GDP per capita of $35,000. In contrast, the North Korean economy is 1/100th the size of South Korea's and a GDP per capita of only $640. This massive gap in wealth has generally resulted in extremely different cuisines, arts, modes of labor, etc. Despite these differences, both states share a common language and pre-20th century history. There are also several millions of 'Koreans' who now reside mainly in China's neighboring Northeastern provinces as Chinese citizens. My point here is to show that the various political boundaries drawn onto maps and naturalized as fixtures of cultural identity are actually illusions. They are subjective decisions imposed onto cultural reality. Boundaries, often drawn by means of exercising power, obscure the fluid nature of cultural geography and similarity. This is not to say that North Koreans, South Koreans, and Chinese Koreans are not really members of their respective national communities - they have developed distinct cultural identities. However, these identities and the boundaries which separate them have been constructed over the course of history. This demands the question: should anthropologists understand nationality as a meaningful term to describe certain common types of cultural identity? Or should its meaning be questioned in the context of its history and relegated to use only in political contexts?
Allen Hanson would answer these questions by noting that we should not value one interpretation of cultural reality over another. Regardless of historical factors, cultural traits should never be discounted or dismissed. This applies especially if a trait forms an important part of how a group understands their own identity. One related takeaway for writing ethnography is not to make judgments on the cultural traits themselves, but to do one's best to historically reconstruct their development. In doing this, an ethnographer must recognize their own interpretations of historical accounts and the subjective nature of the original accounts themselves. Derrida would label 'Korean' as a contested signifier, as it denotes three competing conception of what it means to be a member of this nationality: North, South, and Chinese. He would likely argue that 'nationality' cannot be used to determine rigid boundaries because there are so many various interpretations and applications of the concept. As it relates to anthropology, Derrida would propose that we distinguish between discursive notions of particular signifiers and the specific context which we use such uncertain signifiers.
The same sorts of illusory boundaries are also imposed on language, another pillar of cultural identity. As with nationality, boundaries between language are not clearly defined. There are many regional dialects of Farsi, otherwise known as Persian. In the West, we primarily understand Farsi as the national language of Iran. However, this classification obscures the cultural reality. In neighboring Afghanistan and Tajikistan, the national languages are Dari and Tajik, respectively. However, Farsi, Dari, and Tajik bear striking linguistic similarity. Their grammatical structures have few differences, and all three languages are mutually intelligible (this has been compared to the similar structures of European French and Quebec French). These artificial classificatory boundaries are largely attributable to history. After the Soviet Union assumed political control of the former Russian Empire's geographical expanses, they split up its Central Asian territories along general linguistic 'boundaries'. While this is not a completely coherent concept given these languages' (Kazakh, Uzbek, Turkmen, and Kyrgyz) shared Turkic origin and common structure, these are not mutually intelligible languages. Tajik is the exception - it is an Iranic language. However, Stalin forced all Farsi speakers in what is now Tajikistan to abandon its traditional Perso-Arabic script and convert to Cyrillic. This meant that all Farsi literature and historical documents had to be converted into Cyrillic script - which disconnected Tajiks from the rest of contemporary Farsi-language philosophy, poetry, and academic study. This is a clear artificial boundary which divided a fluid cultural identity through exercise of political power. In Afghanistan, the term 'Dari' was invented to satisfy non-Farsi language groups in the country (they were worried that making the national language Farsi would be a national embarrassment, given the term's historical association with Iran). Reminiscent of Hanson's discussion of contemporary use in New Zealand of old cultural concepts in "The Making of the Maori", the ancient term Dari was revived from its use during Arab rule of Persia in the early Medieval period. While the original purpose of the Maori Io Cult, conversion of Tajik to Cyrillic script, and renaming of Afghan Farsi as Dari are now faded, the consequences of these constructed concepts and boundaries remain.
One suggestion for anthropologists would be to view systems of classification as examples of coercive ideologies that have created inadequate/inaccurate discourses of cultural identity. Categories like nationality, race, language, etc. should exist only for brevity's sake, not as objective analytical tools. Perhaps illusory cultural boundaries only exist because we have naturalized their impositions. Cultural boundaries are drawn subjectively, separating otherwise overlapping and fluid regions of a universal human culture.

I really loved this post, which even included a skillful use of Derrida! Thank you for the fascinating example of "invented" boundaries, language groups, etc. Though Lévi-Strauss would not agree, you make a strong case that the move toward classification is always political.
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